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The métier of living: 
Art, genocide and education 
 
John Baldacchino 
 
Abstract: In art what appears to be a condition for change is almost always 
strategically expedient. This is especially the case when one positions art and 
change within a prosthetic space. Charles Garoian lays claim to this strategy 
by posing prosthesis as the fourth dimension that follows a third synthetic 
stage that dialectically binds a thesis to its antithesis. Re-reading Garoian’s 
claims against the Soviet and Neo-Liberal renditions of Hegel’s theory of the 
dialectic, this paper argues that such claims could reduce art’s space to a 
prosthetic synthesis that risks pedagogical and aesthetic ossification. Given the 
performative élan by which Garoian invests education, this appears 
paradoxical, especially in terms of the personal dimension by which he invests 
his art as a metier of living and surviving a history that is firmly marked by the 
devastation of genocide. Strangely, this paradox is what gives us the ability 
and power by which we could seek a counter-Bildung. As this paper’s author 
puts it, in art such a counter-Bildung takes the form of unlearning by which 
one would exit the predicament of instrumental reason. For unlearning to 
become possible prosthetic syntheses must be reversed by making of arts 
education a case for synthetic prostheses. Only then could Garoian’s 
performative method begin to assert an inverse positioning that would 
effectively counter the instrumentalization of the dialectic, and with it, that of 
history and art.  
 
Author Bio: Dr John Baldacchino holds a Professorial Chair of Arts Education at the 
University of Dundee in Scotland. He served as Associate Dean of Graduate Studies 
and Professor of Arts Pedagogy at Falmouth University in England; as Associate 
Professor of Art & Art Education at Columbia University’s Teachers College in New 
York; as Reader in Critical Theory at Gray’s School of Art in Scotland, and as 
Lecturer of Arts Education and Cultural Studies at the University of Warwick in 
England. He is the author of papers, articles, chapters and books on the arts, 
philosophy and education. His books include Post-Marxist Marxism: Questioning the 
Answer (Ashgate, 1996), Easels of Utopia: Art’s Fact Returned (Ashgate, 1998); 
Avant-Nostalgia: An Excuse to Pause (2002); Education Beyond Education: Self and 
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The métier of living 
Art, genocide and education 
John Baldacchino 
 
Quiero bajar al pozo 
quiero morir mi muerte a bocanadas 
quiero llenar mi corazón de musgo 
para ver al herido por el agua. 
I want to drop down the well,  
I want to die by mouthfuls 
I want to fill my heart with moss   
to see the wounded by water. 
Federico Garcia Lorca (1996a), Casida Del Herido Por El Agua 
[Casida for The Wounded by Water] 
 
Mind is not an inert being but, on the contrary, absolutely restless 
being, pure activity, the negating of ideality of every fixed category of 
the abstractive intellect; not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at 
the same time a distinguishing of itself from itself; not an essence that 
is already finished and complete before its manifestation, keeping itself 
aloof behind its host of appearances, but an essence which is truly 
actual only through the specific forms of its necessary self-
manifestation ... 
Hegel, Philosophy of Mind (Book III of the Encyclopedia) (1971, p. 2, 
para. 378) 
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Charles Garoian clearly sets his theoretical trajectory from the very start of his book: 
“The expansion and extension of my cultural space interconnecting with those of 
others indefinitely, represents the premise of this book: The prosthetic space of art” 
(Garoian, 2013, p. 6). If not closely read this could be misleading. It may well be an 
aim, though as such, the expansion of one’s cultural space remains conditional and 
more so contingent on what it portends to do when (and if) the time comes for an end-
objective to be realized, if at all.  
 I want to think that where prosthesis—let alone a prosthetic space—is 
concerned, it has to give itself the benefit of change. This change often runs on 
borrowed time, as it is neither permanent nor secured. In terms of art, what appears to 
be a condition for change remains expedient. This expediency must not be read as 
improper, but as strategic. Upon entering such space, one must adopt a playful 
approach, where knowledge is more than a set of facts. Here I am thinking of a form 
of gaining knowledge by stealth, a form of espionage.  
 In allowing ourselves the advantage of borrowed time that gives us knowledge 
of what we’re not supposed to know, we could argue that it is not bad to have a 
modicum of an aim. In this way we are more adept to make approximations rather 
than pin ourselves to secured objectives. A modicum, that by its nature is never really 
secured but wagered on prosthetic possibilities, allows us to state that an aim x only 
serves its purpose in telling us what to expect as long as y does not indicate that in 
terms of z it would be better to affirm other objectives, such as aims a, b, d, or n … 
Far from uncertainty, to know other than x or y puts one at a vantage point, while at 
the same time such a way of knowing gives the impression of a prescient 
understanding for which art is often known but where in actual fact there is none other 
than a calculated guess.  
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1. Presumed space 
 
As art finds itself in a presumed space (a space whose truth must always remain 
questioned), it has the privilege of its own speciality. In this respect, art must refuse to 
deliver any affirmed resolution of what seems to be promised in the dialectical 
predicaments of its spatial condition. So while Garoian’s aim appears to be promised 
from the start, a suspended question soon follows suit. This is mostly prompted by a 
desire to engage art with the dialectics of space.  
 Given that Garoian consciously wagers his prosthetic ontology and 
epistemology on art (Garoian, 2013, p. 27), his method of engagement by suspension, 
by epoché, is unavoidable. The suspension is intrinsically phenomenological by force 
of the questions that it poses—in case an objective x finds itself perplexed by other 
possibilities, such as aims a, b, d or n …  
 The space where suspension happens is more than simply inhabited. It is 
performed. This also means that any attempt to define this space remains inadequate. 
By suspending the question and refusing to give one answer, Garoian the performance 
artist plays for time. He also plays with time as he becomes expedient with what he 
calls a prosthetic space. This is where space and time are eternally borrowed from 
what the artist articulates as a further fourth dimension in a dialectic that he 
consciously extends from an aimed synthesis to a newly extended prosthesis.  
 Initially one can never be sure whether Garoian wants the prosthesis to 
necessarily ‘follow’ in the expected triadic procedure of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis, where he appears to follow Henri Lefebvre and assert a positive dialectic. 
However, a positive dialectic seeks progress and a degree of resolution through a 
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number of meditational mechanisms. Because Garoian’s is a practice of embodied art 
and not just a space or time within which this embodiment is simply encased, 
resolution and mediation become questionable. Rather, this state of affairs appears to 
belong to: (a) the ideational assumptions of space as these accommodate anything that 
we as bodied actors would regard as dialectically resolvable (hence Garoian’s allusion 
to Lefebvre’s “science of space” and the mediated dialectic that is enacted through the 
subject qua body); and (b) art’s iteration of a frozen terminus a quo (a point of 
departure) that seems to be hopelessly impeded from ever resolving itself, let alone 
allowed to find its terminus ad quem (a point of arrival). This is because, also from 
the start, Garoian wants to assert with Brian Franklin, that in art a terminus is likely to 
be transformed into a fermata (see Garoian, 2013, pp. 10-12).  
 In this respect, Garoian’s book prompts a line of questioning intended to probe 
the claim of a suspended space and a borrowed time. One wonders whether Garoian’s 
borrowing of time does indeed lapse into a spatial dimension which, as we find in 
art’s method of epoché must be asserted beyond the expected dimensionality with 
which we still struggle since Galileo, even when we have had more than a reassuring 
note, after Einstein, that we can safely go beyond such promised certainties.  
 
2. Finding paradox 
 
In its method of epoché art must seek those paradoxical moments, or events, by which 
it could assert itself as non-art (Baldacchino, 2012). In avoiding the limits of a spatial 
dialectic (Negri, 1991; Baldacchino, 2014), we must substitute the spatial with the 
paradoxical, the relativist with the relational, the factual with the fabular, form with 
the body … etc.  
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 At a further, subjective and indeed personal, level …  
 I want to juxtapose the narrative of Garoian the artist and performer with those 
of his history. I want to know what this juxtaposition brings to the prosthetic space 
that he invites us to share in a pedagogical polis (or is it an agon?) where art and 
education engage in alternating bouts of dispute and accordance.  
 I want to see the artist’s life for what it is, as a life dedicated to something 
other than art, even though without art one suspects that there will be no life—or at 
least, life will not be able to assert itself in the reality that Garoian may want to 
recognise as art’s truth.  
 I want to understand what Garoian means when in the first pages of his book, 
he exercises the highest ontological claim imaginable: his right to be—a right that 
moves beyond sheer existence and begins to suggest a concept of reality that might 
even propound the ability to be itself as in and of itself. By dint of this superior 
right—superior because it sits high on any other human right imaginable—Garoian 
puts form and word into play by means of a “drifting of the imagination and facility 
with the hand.” Beyond art itself, Garoian tells us that the notion of a “playful work” 
coincides with his Armenian parents’ example of survival from genocide.  
Such drifting of the imagination and facility with the hand, playful 
work, research for making meaning, coincided with our parents’ 
fractured lives, their telling of persecutions and atrocities experienced 
as children, surviving the Armenian Genocide, forced from their 
homeland (Garoian, 2013, p. 4). 
 As I see Garoian’s art and philosophy collide and converge with the historical 
fact that he was born notwithstanding the very possibility that genocide would have 
impeded him from even being conceived, I am reminded of Primo Levi’s concept of 
“il mestiere di vivere”—the trade, or indeed the métier, of living (Levi, 1975). 
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3. Prosthetic syntheses 
 
The dialectic is a manifestation of an obstinate and ambiguous beast. It resides in our 
consolations, by which we seek to explain our perceived limits of contingency. It is 
also an aspiring affirmation of the necessary ideals by which we seek to balance out 
the limits that afflict us.  
 As an attitude that is literally thrown in the direction of our grammatical 
assumptions, the dialectic is a self-inflicted externalised explanation. It helps us 
rationalise what we want to retain in its immediacy: our very being.  
 As beings whose reasoning enables us to consciously make our world, we 
insist on taking advantage of and from the poetics of a dialectical logic by which we 
further impose our will on the world. Historically, the consequences of such a poetic 
logic have been varied, ranging from a celebration of “life”—a concept which Ivan 
Illich (Illich & Cayley, 1992, p. 127), rightly reminds us, is a reified distortion of the 
act of living; to the abject rationalisation of death — where, as reflective onlookers, 
we meet “the laughing placard of a toothpaste beauty [and] discern in her flashlight 
grin the grimace of torture” (Adorno, 1991, p. 141). 
 The dialectic is not dissimilar from Promethean fire in that it is stolen from 
history to be used against history. In Marx—or shall we say, after Marx—the dialectic 
found itself split from history, running parallel as a system of dialectical materialism 
to vying for a place with historical materialism. The move seems far removed from 
the Hegelian system that was meant to explain everything without surrogate prosthetic 
events like State Communism or the affirmation of the Monarchic State that Hegel 
(wrongly) regarded as the fulfilment of the Idea in history.  
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 Unforeseen and equally undeterred by the dialectic’s critical logic, old Soviet 
manuals of the dialectic were specifically intent on sealing this binary route 
doctrinally, even where Marx, let alone Hegel, would have objected.1 The scholastics 
of certainty assumed that this would put a scientific structure to the dialectic and 
demonstrate its historical fulfilment in the new proletarian state. They did this by 
prosthetizing the synthesis that was meant to seal the predicament caused by the 
advent of capital in the way humans produce, distribute and consume wealth, which is 
ultimately appropriated and therefore fulfilled by the advent of a command economy 
marked by collective ownership that throws the dialectic into impasse, in that the 
State will wither away.  
 The Soviet fulfilment of the State turned out to be even more problematic than 
Hegel’s comfort with the monarchic State as the fulfilment of the Idea, in that by dint 
of this newly found prosthetic reason, this post-Hegelian generation of self-
proclaimed dialectical scientists wanted to instrumentally—rather than critically—
liberate the proletariat from the gods of capital, religion and the monarchy in one go. 
In many ways, this prosthetic infliction appeared to turn the dialectic onto itself and 
ultimately neuter both its logic and history.  
 
4. Shared belonging(s) 
 
Even when we dismiss the Bildung by which the Soviets prosthetized the dialectic as 
a system that was supposed to enhance the political, social and educational 
emancipation of the proletariat, we expediently forget that in the wake of the so-called 
“post-communist” era, a similar cycle of instrumental—and prosthetic—construction 
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was soon to be reinforced by a period that now carries the misguided appellation of 
“neo-liberalism.” 
 While the Soviet Bildung was publicly rejected in the academic, political and 
mediatized square of George Bush Senior’s New World Order, we often forget that 
what followed suit in Bush’s neo-conservative agenda for the so-called “West” was 
no less reified than the Soviet structure of perceived redemption. Though rejecting the 
outer shell of State-sponsored redemption, the victors saw themselves as the 
legitimate heirs of the spoils of war and acted accordingly. In true post-war fashion, 
those who came forward to write the “Western” victor’s history, such as Francis 
Fukuyama (1992), reclaimed the same philosophical patriarch: Hegel. Yet again, 
Hegel is the prophet of “Western” claim to the “end of history.” Not unlike his Soviet 
counterparts, Fukuyama presents Bush’s New World Order with a dialectic that vied 
with history intending to bring it to an end. In other words, albeit reworded and 
carefully choreographed as a victory of liberal-democracy, the split between the 
dialectic and history remained firmly within the Western world-outlook. The 
prosthesis got a new look, but it functioned just as it did in the “Old” World Order. 
 On humbler domestic grounds, the same state of affairs was being confirmed. 
Similar assumptions were (and continue to be) made on art and education, in that to 
this day nothing has changed in the instrumental outlook that moves them. Considered 
as the domains of human action where society is expected to fulfil the presumed 
termini by which men and women are deemed to have their future secured and 
guaranteed, art and education form part of the same prosthetic synthesis by which 
contradiction is ironed out and the assumptions of coherence, realization and freedom 
are force-fed. 
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 There is no doubt that the folding of the dialectic onto itself by prosthetic 
means—be they Soviet or liberal, social-democratic or neo-liberal, reactionary or neo-
conservative—has remained broadly unchanged by the end of the Cold War. This 
extended and supplemented scenario continues to sustain the same aprioristic 
assumptions that were presumed by the vying relationship between history and the 
dialectic, as formulated by the post-Hegelian engineers of the Soviet State on one 
hand and the conservative custodians of the Hegelian justification of the State on the 
other. One could even argue that the scenario of Left and Right Hegelians, with which 
Marx and Engels so sharply engaged in their youth (Marx & Engels, 1975), never left 
us. The same patterns of an instrumental rendition of a dialectical logic retain great 
relevance to our reading of history today—especially after history’s presumed “end” 
was falsely heralded from the abandoned trenches of the Cold War.2 
 So it should not be surprising to realise that in the constructivist assumptions 
to which we still attach our many banners, we are still technically professed to the 
very same structure that Hegel’s self-proclaimed heirs on the right and the left have 
transformed into an instrumental prosthetic tool.  
 More so the reassurance of this prosthetic solution is continuously being 
domesticated by the actuality of human thinking and action. In this respect we all 
belong to this reassuring abode, even though many are not ready to admit it. Now that 
the Cold War is over, we can see how we all claim a common prosthetic belonging. 
This cuts across the parameters of all the conservative, liberal and progressive 
educational polities, which, in our divergent postures, we claim as exclusively ours. 
 As we begin to understand what this means to us people of the post-
communist and neo-liberal diaspora, we realise that far from the gods, the makers of 
fire and history are none other than us—whether we happen to be proud independents, 
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members of a progressive, liberal or conservative middle class, self-proclaimed 
members of the Occupy Movement, or the angry revellers of the Tea Party. As the 
conservative British Prime Minister, David Cameron, has (in)famously said about the 
most recent economic recession when he announced his government’s programme of 
austerity: “We are all in it together.” (And we must not forget that Mr. Cameron’s 
government brought together two diametrically opposed parties, Liberals and Tories, 
who a week before they formed their coalition represented the left and right spectrum 
of British politics, leaving the traditionally left-of-centre Labour party in the middle.)   
 
5. Exiting 
 
At this stage, we are struck by a sense of impasse in that there seems to be no real 
getaway. Prospects of an exit by which, like the disciples of old, we could escape into 
society to proclaim the Spirit, look pretty dim. Pentecostal exits look frightfully shut. 
This is because the prosthetic supplementation of the dialectic appears to have 
extinguished the very fire that we planned to steal.  
 Thus we take refuge in the nostalgic, and though we don’t profess the realism 
by which art, together with philosophy, always felt obliged to “change” the world (a 
world that would have changed anyway because after all is said and done, the 
dialectic is historically bound), the productivist aesthetic that ensued in our political, 
cultural and educational projects remained central to our narratives of freedom and 
knowledge—especially in those pseudo-liberal guises by which history’s temporal 
relativity was conveniently suppressed in the name of a supplemented system that was 
hailed as the offshoot of Hegel’s dialectic.  
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 John Dewey already anticipates this absolutist phenomenon in the 1930s, 
where he specifically warns against this predicament:  
This absolutism, this ignoring and denial of temporal relativity, is one 
great reason why the earlier liberalism degenerated so easily into 
pseudo-liberalism. For the sake of saving time, I shall identify what I 
mean by this spurious liberalism, the kind of social ideas represented 
by the “Liberty League” and ex-President Hoover. I call it a pseudo-
liberalism because it ossified and narrowed generous ideas and 
aspirations. Even when words remain the same, they mean something 
very different when they are uttered by a minority struggling against 
repressive measures and when expressed by a group that, having 
attained power, then uses ideas that were once weapons of 
emancipation as instruments for keeping the power and wealth it has 
obtained (Dewey, 1935, p. 226).  
 Those who still insist on the redemptive qualities, by which they pose their 
claim for political, educational and artistic constructs, mostly ignore this predicament 
and are the first to deny temporal relativity. Perhaps the best examples of this denial 
are found in the cycle of overarching educational policies where a standardised 
utopian promise seals the worse of possible outcomes. In the United States, we find 
No Child Left Behind and now its would-be answer, Common Core. In Britain we find 
iterations of a similar kind that broadly anticipate or follow what happens across the 
Atlantic. In both Britain and the US, the rhetoric is the same, where what is perceived 
as “poor performance,” attention is drawn towards Asia, particularly China, South 
Korea and Japan. At this stage one can only imagine what effect such policies have 
had on the arts in education, where more often than not, an epistemological hierarchy 
is reinforced against the expected measures of production and industry (See 
Baldacchino, 2013b).  
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 This is where Garoian’s work raises some thorny issues, especially when he 
invites us to consider a dialogical horizon where discourse has no choice but to 
recognise its fragmentary and contingent condition. This condition is pretty much 
represented by the method of collage where complete pictures are no more—not that 
there has ever been a complete picture! In rejecting the myth of an original or 
consequent completion, we are urged to value the connections rather than the object, 
by recognizing the fragmentary as truth in its state of perpetual altering and slippage.  
 Here I find the possibility of education—more specifically the possibility of 
pedagogy—to which Garoian invites me to consider his concept of a prosthetic space. 
But as I hear this invitation, I also look back with fear and anxiety to the prosthetic 
syntheses that the legatees of the Cold War continue to add to the dialectic. I also 
wonder how safe we are and whether we could be in for another problematic 
relationship of this kind.  
 On the other hand, Garoian reassures me when he says that he sees the 
possibility of pedagogy in the “troubling, incompatibility of prosthesis” (Garoian, 
2013, p. 29). He further explains that a prosthetic pedagogy is “an embodied form of 
art research and teaching that challenges and resists both the disabling stereotypes and 
stigmas of the amputated as dysfunctional, and the fear and loathing of technological 
supplements that enable the body’s agency” (Garoian, 2013, p. 29). 
 
6. Impasse 
 
As I begin to assess Garoian’s reassurances, I would also insist that I am not ready to 
ascribe a redemptive character to his prosthetic pedagogy, and I suspect neither would 
he. This is because I see no fulfilment or atonement in trying to reify, let alone use 
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education as some realm where childhood dreams are realized or where social 
foundations for peace and tranquillity are laid down, let alone guaranteed. If anything, 
education promises the opposite, and that is why pedagogy should be read as a form 
of negation, indeed a road to Bildung, which Hegel (1977, p. 49) reminds us, is “the 
pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way of despair.” 
 While childhood cannot afford the comforts of memory (because we only have 
a memory of childhood, while childhood itself is too short to entertain for itself a 
memory of its own), we have to “grow up” and confront the realities by which we 
question and reject learning per se.   
 By challenging every single assumption that is held constant—such as that of 
learning and development through art and education—I find strength in Garoian’s 
proposal. It may well be that this is not what Garoian wants or intends, and I am sure 
he would probably object to my insistence that there is no solace to be found in 
learning per se (See Baldacchino, 2013a and 2014). Yet far from being dystopian, I 
would argue that this is what we have and we cannot assume that we can have 
anything else, although this does not mean that we have lost the ability to transcend 
the here and now. Indeed it is imperative that as artists and educators we engage in the 
aesthetic possibilities that Maxine Greene, referring to Herbert Marcuse, articulates as 
“the qualities of art that allow it to indict established reality and evoke images of 
liberation” and “the relevance of art in overcoming the inability to see others” 
(Greene, 2000, p. 136). 
 I would argue that on art’s horizon we must be allowed to run riot, while 
imagining and seeking a desired exit. I would hone in on the idea of exiting because, 
as I have argued at length elsewhere, art makes a clear case for an exit pedagogy. 
(Baldacchino, 2012) More so, our ability to exit belongs to the quandary of art’s 
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political realization of impasse as that moment where revolution begins to appear. I 
would accentuate art’s quandary because art cannot prescribe how, when, or in what 
form does a revolutionary condition emerge, if at all.  
 What seems to entertain us with a degree of certainty (at least when we look 
back at recent or distant forms of revolutionary practice) is that revolutions are events 
that emerge in disparate ways—very much like fragments that refuse the notion of 
necessary completion. By means of these willed fragments, women and men assume 
their right to put together a collage that accentuates the very transience by which they 
value life’s contingent nature.  
 One could argue that Goya’s pictorial predicament of a revolution (in the 
figure of Saturn) devouring its own children represents that very moment when men 
and women begin to insist that their picture is exclusively complete and that there is 
no longer a need for a collage of other pictures. At this stage the revolution devours 
its own children and begins to impose the historical myth of a completed image. This 
predicament afflicted all great revolutions—American, French and Soviet alike. It 
also aborted the most recent uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, where new forms 
of completion soon emerged as soon as new dictators began to prosthetise the 
syntheses of the people’s revolution and suppressed the course of the people’s own 
dialectic.  
 Here I would reassert the revolutionary case for impasse as that which 
emerges from an historical awareness that any attempt to politicize art by turning it 
into a form of direct action results in fetishist consumption and ultimately in a 
prosthetic condition that halts its embodied self.  
 More importantly, I would add that this risk of fetishist consumption is clearly 
found in those constructivist arguments by which we have continuously promised an 
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emancipatory outcome through the arts and education. This is why any assumption of 
the political in art must be sought in the condition of impasse and the asserted right of 
an exit pedagogy, where the myth of benign emancipation and constructivist 
completion is rejected and where we begin to argue that as a political act, art is 
located in “what we have not yet found” (See Baldacchino, 2012, pp. 12-14). 
 
6. Synthetic prosthesis 
 
Before I continue to follow Garoian’s pedagogical trajectories, I want to qualify my 
terms of reference, especially in view of the implicit critique that I offer above 
(particularly in §3 and §4), where I express great anxiety over the constructivist 
foreclosure by which the dialectic becomes afflicted when, in their parallel ways, both 
the right and the left purposely alienate the dialectic from history, purporting to 
supplement it with their own prostheses in an effort to control the people’s history.  
 I therefore propose that Garoian’s argument for prosthesis needs to assert an 
inverse positioning that would effectively counter the prosthetic synthesis by which 
the dialectic has become instrumentalized, especially in tangible and sensitive realms 
such as art and education. This prompts me to re-read Garoian’s dialectical 
positioning vis-à-vis Hegel’s triadic structure, which in its logical structure does not 
necessitate supplementation because it is implicitly assumed to supplement itself by 
dint of its contradictory nature. Paradoxically the triad is not fixed as a threesome, but 
as a pattern by which contradiction is legitimised and the scenario of “A is not A” 
gains full philosophical and practical validity (see §7, below).  
 When a legitimised paradox is further supplemented by a prosthetic space that 
is signified by liminality, contingency and ephemerality (see Garoian, 2013, p. 62), it 
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represents an iteration of a further contradiction. While this may well be a 
pedagogical and artistic inevitability, on a political level this iteration could be very 
problematic. A second iterative contradiction, unless qualified and critically 
positioned, could well expose the assumption of a prosthetic pedagogy of art to 
systematic manipulation—as indeed one finds in various examples of progressive and 
critical pedagogical projects which find themselves co-opted in those reactionary and 
conservative political practices that originally they set out to refuse.  
 As in the case of the articulation of the State as a prosthetic synthesis that is 
meant to marginalise, and ultimately eliminate the liminal and the contingent, unless 
qualified, a second iterative contradiction could well neuter the legitimation of 
paradox by which a dialectical logic proceeds.  
 I therefore suggest that to perceive this prosthetic space as a further iteration 
of the legitimation of a paradox that sustains itself (perhaps as a fermata), prosthesis 
must be consciously posed as a synthetic prosthesis, and therefore as a performative 
event within the dialectical space itself. In many ways, this could be a viable approach 
to understand art as aporia. The inversion of a prosthetic synthesis to a synthetic 
prosthesis is important because to say that a fourth, prosthetic dimension must be 
construed as an interruption—a fermata—of the teleological projects inherent in 
everyone’s history, is not only bold but carries immense political-aesthetic 
responsibilities, particularly in matters pedagogical.   
 Furthermore, the notion of a prosthesis raises questions around the 
possibilities of doing and thinking, as inherently assumed in art as a critical event, and 
more so with regards to education in its perlocutionary assumptions of learning and 
development. To argue that a dialectical approach needs to be supplemented by a 
fourth prosthetic moment is to alter the fundamental “space” of critical reasoning 
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itself. Lest we forget, the dialectic remains at the very core of critical theory’s logic. 
Without such logic there is no critical theory as such, but there will be something else. 
This is not to assert a foundational methodological approach to theory—far from it! 
But if one must assert a critical theoretical approach, its logical categories must 
remain, by their paradoxical implications, dialectical.  
 So in the allocated space that remains for this essay, I will briefly revisit the 
context in which Garoian locates his prosthetic pedagogical theory of art. Then I will 
position this against three commentaries by which Hegel’s dialectic is in turn located: 
McTaggart’s, Stace’s and Adorno’s. In addition, I want to set this analysis within the 
educational contexts of a dialectical logic as a form of thinking and teaching, as 
articulated by Evald Ilyenkov; after which I will briefly return to the ideational 
assumptions of space and art’s frozen iterations of its possible termini (that I pose in 
§1), by which I would then attempt to locate Garoian’s theory of prosthetic art 
pedagogy vis-à-vis the metier of living on the edges of genocide.  
 
7. The dialectic’s beyond 
 
Garoian attributes the addition of prosthesis to Hegel’s dialectical triad of thesis—
antithesis—synthesis to Chris Gray et al.’s The Cyborg Handbook (1995), which he 
cites and elaborates as follows: 
As these scholars [Gray et al] suggest, 
thesis/antithesis/synthesis/prosthesis represents a fourfold, open and 
mutable epistemology that enables oppositional discourses beginning 
with the dialogic thesis/antithesis, followed by a resolving of its 
tension through synthesis, then indeterminate flights of understanding 
that extend beyond our bodies and symbiotically interconnect with 
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others and broaden our capacity to understand and accept difference in 
the world. The indeterminacy of prosthesis is constituted by 
disjunctive, incongruous fragments of image and ideas, knowledge and 
understandings, whose complex, irreducible slippages of meaning 
resist synthetic closure similar to the ways in which collage narrative 
resists concrescence (Garoian, 2013, p. 32). 
 This urges me to briefly make reference to other approaches to Hegel’s 
dialectic, where we have to remind ourselves that, as Adorno (1993, p. 9) put it, “The 
dialectic is neither a mere method by which spirit might elude the cogency of its 
object (…) nor is it a weltanschauung into whose schema one has to squeeze reality.” 
Rather, the dialectic is marked by implicit contradictions, as these emerge from 
insights and needs that are historically and experientially bound to ways of 
understanding the world. “Just as the dialectic does not favour individual definitions, 
so there is no definition that fits it.” Adorno sums this by adding that the “[d]ialectic 
is the unswerving effort to conjoin reason’s critical consciousness of itself and the 
critical experience of objects” (Adorno, 1993, p. 10). 
 Interestingly there is always a tendency of straightjacketing the dialectic, both 
by those who turn it into an instrumental method—as we have seen in the case of the 
State; and more so by those who, in the name of positivist measure and verification 
(so commonly used in educational theory), regard it as a futile theoretical exercise.      
 Yet classical commentators on Hegel’s dialectic such as John McTaggart, state 
from the start that, “the first and deepest cause of the dialectic movement is the 
instability of all finite categories, due to their imperfect nature” (McTaggart, 1922, 
para. 4). It is this state of immediacy, an uncritical state that many would assume as 
being there and therefore taken as a measure to be verified, that a dialectical approach 
will immediately put into question. “The immediate result of this instability is the 
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production of contradictions,” adds McTaggart, “since the imperfect category 
endeavours to return to the more concrete unity of which it is one side, it is found to 
involve the other side of that unity, which is its own contrary” (McTaggart, 1922, 
para. 4). 
 Rather than a fixed method, we find that in our own logical instincts of 
discerning a contradiction in anything that claims to be immediately fixed, our critical 
approach leads us to argue that nothing can be assumed as such, or indeed as not 
needing any form of mediation. The gap between what we might expect as an ideal 
immediate form of completion and what is lacking, prompts us to think critica lly: 
“And, again, to the existence of the contradiction we owe the advance of the 
dialectic.” McTaggart goes on to sum up Hegel’s approach as follows:  
[I]t is the contradiction involved in the impossibility of predicating a 
category without predicating its opposite which causes us to abandon 
that category as inadequate. We are driven on first to its antithesis. And 
when we find that this involves the predication of the thesis, as much 
as this latter had involved the predication of the antithesis, the 
impossibility of escaping from contradictions in either extreme drives 
us to remove them by combining both extremes in a synthesis which 
transcends them. (McTaggart, 1922, para. 4, emphasis added) 
 Another classic articulation of Hegel’s dialectic, this time found in W.T. 
Stace’s The Philosophy of Hegel (1955), confirms this state of affairs in a slightly 
more technical approach. “What is new in Hegel, then, is that he formulates, as an 
explicit logical principle, what was tacitly implied in previous systems.” Stace 
explains how, “[h]itherto it had always been assumed that, logically speaking, a 
positive and its negative simply excluded each other, were cut off from each other by 
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an impassable gulf. It had always been assumed that we can only say A is A, and that 
we can never under any circumstances say A is not-A” (Stace, 1955, p. 96 para. 129). 
 Hegel, on the other hand, had to find a way out of this predicament because 
otherwise the gaps and subsequent negation, by which a contradiction would allow us 
to engage critically with the world, would remain proscribed. “If we can only say A is 
A, the infinite is the infinite, then A must remain A for ever, the infinite must remain 
infinite, and therefore sterile within itself, forever, and the infinite world can never 
arise out of it. We can only solve this problem if the infinite contains the finite, just as 
being contains not-being, if the infinite is the finite, if A is not-A” (Stace, 1955, p. 96 
para. 129). 
 This is where the whole mystery of the Hegelian triad disappears and becomes 
germane to our experience as thinking beings that make the world. Stace already 
warns his readers that this is not to be presented as a perfect system, and by 
implication it must be read for what it is. “The description of the dialectic method 
(…) is an ideal description,” says Stace, “a description of what the method aims at 
being or ought to be. In practice it is sometimes difficult to see how this description 
applies to some of Hegel’s actual triads.” 
For example, in the philosophy of spirit Hegel puts forward as one of 
his triads the notions of art, religion, and philosophy. Here art is 
supposed to be the thesis, religion the antithesis, philosophy the 
synthesis. It is very difficult to see in what sense religion is the 
opposite of art; and it is quite impossible to see that art and philosophy 
are related as genus and species, or that religion can be regarded as the 
differentia. Numerous similar examples might be given. There are even 
cases of triads which contain four terms! (Stace, 1995, p. 96, para. 130) 
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 Far from being seen as a weakness in Hegelian thought, we find in this a 
fecundity that flows beyond its perceived boundaries. It might be scandalous to those 
scholastics who expected it to retain a ferrous method; while such talk still appears as 
folly to those in whose expectations, theory and reasoning must only belong to forms 
of “research” which, apart from attracting huge grants for universities, they are 
expected to remain simple and measurable enough to have an “impact” on what they 
see as immediate and “useful” (read “instrumental”). 
 Adorno reminds his readers that, “[t]he quintessence of the conditioned, 
according to Hegel, is the unconditioned. It is this, not least of all, that gives rise to 
the hovering, suspended quality of Hegelian philosophy, its quality of being up in the 
air, its permanent skandalon: the name of the highest speculative concept, that of the 
absolute, of something utterly detached, is literally the name of that suspended 
quality” (Adorno, 1993, p. 13). It is in this skandalon that Hegel pays the price of his 
consistency, and in this Adorno says, one finds the essence of Hegelian dialectic “its 
ultimate truth, that of its own impossibility, in its unresolved and vulnerable quality” 
(1993, p. 13).  
 
9. Paradox’s pedagogy 
 
Though far less known than his colleague Lev Vygotsky, the Soviet philosopher, 
psychologist and logician Evald Ilyenkov has left a body of vibrant work that covers, 
amongst other the profound relationship between ontology, epistemology and 
dialectical logic. In his brilliant essay “Our schools must teach how to think!” he 
boldly states that in contrast with Pavolv’s dog, “[f]or a human being (…) the 
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appearance of a contradiction is a signal to activate ‘thinking’ and not hysteria” 
(Ilyenkov, 2007, p. 22).  
 That contradiction signals an activation of “thinking” must be taught from 
childhood, Ilyenkov states. “Here lies the sole key to the transformation of ‘didactics’ 
on the basis of dialectical materialism, on the basis of dialectics as the materialist 
logic and theory of knowledge” (2007, p. 22). The core of dialectics is indeed 
contradiction, and to that effect Ilyenkov wants to use the vibrant heritage of 
dialectical forms of reasoning which he traces from Aristotle, through to scholastic 
philosophers like Duns Scotus, to the vibrancy of Spinoza’s philosophy of knowledge, 
onto Hegel and Marx.  
 Ilyenkov’s care for the materialist, or indeed dialectical materialism, is not 
prompted by the Soviet commissar’s attention to the vying between history and the 
dialectic. Instead this must be read and traced from forms of philosophical thinking 
which paid utmost attention to the actuality by which matter—understood as the 
ground on which Aristotelian thinking emerges—converges with a further, much 
more dynamic notion of matter, which takes a major shift with the turn in quantum 
physics and the theory of relativity. Thus not surprisingly, this materialist tradition 
also includes a theologian of the calibre of Duns Scotus, whose philosophy must 
feature, if not with overt prominence, with tacit implication. 
 Once the equivocal use of politically accepted terms is cleared and 
understood, 3 and once Ilyenkov’s attention to materialism is reviewed from the wider 
sense of an attention to immanence (including the realms of the subject, of which the 
positivist would disapprove), his approach to education gains considerable 
appreciation in its fuller dynamic qualities. Here, Ilyenkov argues for the expectation, 
or aim, for “a person [to develop] the ability to perform actions that require him to go 
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beyond the given conditions of a task.” In this action, we find the ever-growing 
horizon a dialectical approach, which “exists wherever a person goes beyond that set 
of given conditions within which the task remains solved and unsolved (and therefore 
has the appearance of a ‘logical contradiction’ between the ‘goal’ and the ‘means’ for 
attaining it) into that broader set of conditions within which it is really (…) solved” 
(Ilyenkov, 2007, p. 23). 
 Resolution for Ilyenkov, implies transformation and indeed a paradox. It is 
never positivist and is far from being an obliging sense of pacification. This prompts 
him to attribute a robust pedagogical value to the triadic pattern that moves from 
thesis, to antithesis, to synthesis. Thinking moves from an object-oriented form of 
action to that of contemplation, and so from object to subject, thus engaging in realms 
of knowledge by which one mediates an immediate situation with a far wider 
transcendental context—understood as a context beyond the immediate.  
 If “A” is known to us (its qualitative or quantitative 
characteristics or “parameters” are given) and we need to find “B”—
that is, express “B” through the characteristics of “A”—and do not as 
yet know this “B,” then this means that for the time being we can say 
only that it is “not-A.” But what is it apart from being “not-A”? 
 It is for this that we need to find a transition or “bridge.” The 
transition from one thing to a second—from “A” to “not-A”—can in 
general be accomplished only through a “mediating link,” through a 
“middle term of the deduction,”  or—as it is called in logic—through 
“a third.” 
 Finding such a middle term is always the chief difficulty of a 
task. It is here that the presence or absence of “sharp-wittedness,” 
“resourcefulness,” and other qualities of the “intelligent mind” comes 
to light.   
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 This unknown “third” always possesses clearly marked 
dialectical properties. Namely, it must incorporate simultaneously the 
characteristics of “A”  and the characteristics of “B” (that is, “not-A”).  
 For “A” it must represent “B” and for “B” it must be an image 
of “A.” (Ilyenkov, 2007, p. 23) 
  In his contextualisation of the Hegelian triad within a pedagogical realm, 
Ilyenkov clearly articulates a way of valuing contradiction, indeed paradox, within an 
environment where knowledge is not simply concerned with what is expected, but 
where it emerges from that which is never learnt, that which is not there. “Dialectics 
consists in formulating a ‘contradiction,’ bringing it to the fullest sharpness and 
clarity of expression, and then finding a real, concrete, object-related, and therefore 
obvious, resolution of it. And this is always accomplished by discovering a new fact 
in the context of which the “contradiction” previously exposed by us is 
simultaneously realized and concretely resolved” (Ilyenkov, 2007, p. 24). 
 
10. Wounded by water 
 
Ilyenkov operates with great mastery in all the skills that require him to be a 
dialectician. As he hides his real and radical meanings behind acceptable jargon, he 
plays his nomenclature against the nomenklatura. The skills by which he plays the 
dialectic are not dissimilar from the skills by which an artist like Garoian plays the 
general assumptions of life, against the peculiarities, indeed the happiness, tragedies, 
and forms of survival, by which he sees himself growing up on the edge of the well in 
which many have fallen to the cataclysms of history. 
 This finally brings me back, and juxtaposes my dialectical excursus over 
Garoian’s prosthetic pedagogy of art. As he promises in the very first page, in his art 
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and in his role as educator, the jocular ways of survival are never out of his reach: “I 
lost track of time during that conversation with my teacher. I felt relief as the words 
released effortlessly from my mouth,” Garoian recounts, “although our exchange 
seemed strange and out of context. Prior to this, no teacher had ever asked or cared 
about my cultural history” (Garoian, 2013, p. 82). 
 Garoian recalls when his art teacher asked him about his Armenian heritage, 
sparking a moment which turned a space of learning into a space of unlearning the 
normality by which one’s heritage and ancestry is often taken for granted. Garoian 
soon unlearnt the assumptions that a classroom is unrelated to the personal world out 
there. Garoian exited into the reality of his own history, and became aware that his 
and his family form part of a world in which education also matters to the streets and 
to the vineyard where his father grew grapes in California, and to the home where his 
mother took up sewing to earn extra cash. 
 This recalls the concept of space and art’s fermata that I questioned in the 
opening paragraphs of this essay.  There I probed into (a) the ideational assumptions 
of space as these accommodate anything that we as bodied actors would regard as 
dialectically resolvable; and (b) art’s iteration of a frozen terminus a quo that seems to 
be hopelessly impeded from ever resolving itself. In these two questions I find an 
echo in Garoian’s purpose for giving an account of the story from his youth: (a) he 
“wanted to accentuate the liminal and contingent characteristics of art making, 
namely, its enabling learners to expose, examine, and critique academic institutions 
and corporate assumptions through performances of subjectivity based on their 
personal memories and cultural histories” (Garoian, 2013, p. 83), and (b) “to evoke 
suspense, an anxious curiosity about how the associative yet indeterminate 
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relationship between our individual private memories and the corporate, public 
memory of the museum is constituted by prosthetic pedagogy” (Garoian, 2013, p. 84). 
 In this I begin to find forms of convergence between my own anxiety over the 
prosthetic synthesis of the State and the synthetic prosthesis that Garoian offers on 
account of his own engagement with the wounds of history. As I say this, I am 
reminded of how the metier of living shifts, at least in my imaginary, from that of the 
holocaust survivor Primo Levi, to the poet who is murdered by Franco’s fascist 
squads, Federico Garcia Lorca.  
 Lorca had a particular affectation for the feeling and image of the wound, 
which he regarded as a permanence that never finds healing. In his Ode to Dalí, he 
depicts the image of wounded handkerchiefs that virginally mark a horizon that is 
self-aggregating in crystals of fish and the moon. In his Theory and Play of the 
Duende, he explains how “[w]ith idea, sound and gesture, the duende enjoys an open 
struggle with the creator on the edge of a well” (Lorca, 1996b, pp. 152-3). The image 
of the well folds onto that of the open wound, where Lorca’s work sustains the image 
of a permanent injury in a state of perpetuation—almost as a fermata; whether it is St. 
Teresa of Avila being wounded by an angel, the torero Ignacio Sánchez Mejías killed 
in a bullfight, or the child wounded by water in the well. Lorca’s wound metaphor 
also denotes an abyss that is never closed and a verge that is never surpassed.4  
 Does this leave us on the verge of life, one wonders? Where does this verge 
appear, if at all? And how could one bode for survival or indeed a healing or 
resolution, if there seems to be no hope that the wound will cure? 
 This is where I find most value in Garoian’s argument for the prosthetic hope 
by which we find ways of realizing that what has been lost cannot come back, or 
cannot be recovered, and yet while this holds true, we also know that what we can 
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create moves beyond what has been lost. In this, I would go with Garoian’s 
reassurance and while I remain cautious of the prosthesis that follows the synthesis, I 
also know that politically, we still have a chance of stealing the fire, which the 
prosthetic State has carefully concealed from us.       
 But how do we know where the fire is hidden and how could we win? 
 When all is said and done, the dialectic’s scandalous claim of the Absolute is 
one of our few cues to what it actually is—us, ourselves, in whose “restless being,” 
Hegel reminds us, we come to negate the “ideality of every fixed category.”  
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Notes 
 
1  A good example of this manual is Sheptulin’s Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1980) 
which, written in a systematic style, it clearly distinguishes these two pillars of the 
dialectic, conceived partly to confirm how dialectical materialism and historical 
materialism follow a pattern of fulfillment between theory (dialectical logic) and 
practice (history). 
2 Here I have in mind the great Soviet philosopher and psychologist Evald Ilyenkov, 
whose work Dialectical Logic (1977) remains, albeit little known, one of the best 
books on dialectics and epistemology. Ilyenkov offers a succinct study of the dialectic 
during a time when in the Soviet Union it was not advisable for philosophers to dwell 
 John Baldacchino | The métier of living: Art, genocide and education |  31 
 
much on the Hegelian, let alone Spinozist lineage in Marx. In threading between the 
ideological police of the Marxist-Leninist Institute and his own philosophical rigour, 
Ilyenkov provides his readers with an invaluable insight into the development of 
dialectical logic and epistemology, presented within the parameters that Soviet 
philosophy, without, however, succumbing to the dogmatic implications that it 
imposed.  
3 Readers must bear in mind that in adopting accepted terminology, Ilyenkov could 
guarantee not only his academic survival, but more often than not, his own life (which 
ended in tragic circumstances in 1979). One needs to bear in mind that Soviet scholars 
were expected to demonstrate their loyalty to a jargon that did not always fit within 
their own scheme, but which they had to adapt and adopt in order to retain exposure 
with their students and other academics within and beyond the Soviet Union. In this 
respect, reading Ilyenkov always requires a degree of familiarity with Soviet 
“Marxist-Leninist” discourse. A skill for reading between the lines of Soviet 
philosophy, reveals more than what the philosopher appears to be saying in the 
immediacy of his or her words. This is particularly important when reading books like 
Ilyenkov’s Dialectical Logic (1977), Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of 
Positivism (1982a), which begins but then moves beyond Lenin, offering an 
interesting critique of positivism that retains tangible relevance in today’s climate of 
measure, and Dialectics of the Abstract and the concrete in Marx’s Capital (1982b), 
which in the 60s reflects a fundamental turn in the Soviet acceptance of the “young 
Marx” whose Hegelian undertones were anathematized by Stalin’s ideological police. 
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4 I discuss Lorca’s aesthetic in some detail in Makings of the Sea. (Baldacchino, 2010, 
pp. 115-134) 
